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ABSTRACT 
Garrett Workman: Economic Nationalism -  
Transatlantic Responses to the Financial Crisis in Comparative Perspective 
(Under the direction of Gary Marks) 
 
 As during financial crises of the past, the current economic recession has 
witnessed a dramatic increase in government intervention in the economy, coupled with a 
tremendous decrease in global trade flows.  By examining the contemporary rise in 
economic nationalism as well as the political sources calling for protection in a historical 
context, this thesis highlights the potential dangers of closing borders to foreign goods 
and services.  Through a comparative analysis of both the American and French 
responses to the financial crisis, this essay argues that while government intervention is 
frequently necessary and worthwhile, several protectionist actions included within 
stimulus packages have actually served to deepen the recession.  Ultimately, this paper 
concludes that while the tendency towards protectionism demonstrated in recent months 
is discouraging, the world’s trading system has fortunately not collapsed underneath the 
combined pressures of politics and economic nationalism. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This thesis seeks to explore and explain the tendencies of the American and 
French governments to protect their domestic industries, ostensibly temporarily, to the 
detriment of their commitments to global trade liberalization and continued economic 
growth through openness to trade.  France and the United States were chosen as case 
studies due to their standings as preeminent economic powers, and also because of their 
widely divergent state responses to the financial crisis.  The level of government 
intervention in the United States has far exceeded the role of the French state rhetorically 
as well as in terms of stimulus dollars appropriated, both in real terms and per capita.  
Interestingly, this reaction is at odds with the national tradition both in largely laissez-
faire America and dirigiste France. 
First, the current economic crisis is placed in a comparative perspective with the 
many informative historical parallels that can be drawn with respect to the Great 
Depression.  Through a demonstration of the disastrous effects of protectionism during 
the 1930s, the fears of modern economists are more easily justified.  An analysis of 
legislation and political responses to the financial crisis which began in late 2007 
including the controversial “Buy American” provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 as well as French protectionist rhetoric in recent months will 
then serve as an introduction to the reemerging issue of economic nationalism.  
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Additionally, this essay will attempt to rationalize the varying responses taken by the 
French and American governments to the financial crisis through a study of the specific 
groups and economic interests calling for trade protection in each case.  With 
governments expending ever-larger sums of public money attempting to mitigate the 
effects of the recession, an analysis of the effectiveness of these stimulus packages is 
both informative and necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 Back in October of 1929, the world bore witness to what is widely considered the 
worst stock market crash in the history of market capitalism.  Over the course of about a 
week, the New York Stock Exchange lost over a quarter of its value, sending the 
industrialized world into the worst economic crisis in history—the Great Depression.  
One of the principal causes of this panic on Wall Street was the rumor that then-President 
Hoover would not veto the extremely protectionist Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act that 
Congress was considering at the time.  Understanding the consequences of closing the 
nation’s borders to trade better than any Congressman ever could, the stock brokers were 
thrown into a frenzy in an attempt to sell their shares before their values plummeted any 
further.  Quickly, the economic crisis spread beyond the shores of the United States, 
creating a climate across the entire globe where citizens were suddenly thrown into 
unemployment and demanding protections from their governments.  As the 
interdependent world economies were suddenly closing themselves off from each other, 
the crisis worsened and the world was soon entangled in the deadliest war in human 
history. 
 Signed into law by President Hoover in June 1930, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act 
increased duties on imports into the United States by a factor of up to 52% on average.  
In an attempt to protect and aid American industry, as well as prevent a further decrease 
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in global product values, the U.S. Congress passed this law in an ill-fated attempt to stem 
the downward tide of the global economy.  However, international trade represented a 
very small percentage of the American economy in 1930, and any increase in tariffs 
would ultimately have an extremely limited effect in stimulating the economy.  However, 
the retaliatory measures that the rest of the world inevitably enacted in response 
eventually combined to make the situation infinitely worse.  Suddenly, the Americans 
stopped investing their capital abroad because of the stock market crashes, and the new 
Tariff act ensured that the American economy was also essentially off-limits to the 
exported goods from other nation-states.  Foreign governments could only ratify tariff 
increases of their own to attempt to make up the loss of income: “Privés à la fois du 
débouché et des crédits américains, les pays qui ne disposent pas de réserves de change 
ou qui sont endettés ne peuvent financier leur déficit commercial et doivent à leur tour 
fermer leur marché” (Bénichi 2008 : 113).  In a vain attempt to shelter the United States 
from the outside world, the government had unknowingly started a protectionist wave of 
trade barriers which combined to create the worst ever collapse of capitalism. 
 Similarly, the failure of the world’s governments to coordinate and take corrective 
economic actions together ensured that the Great Depression would last several years 
longer than the natural progression of capitalism would have otherwise dictated.  Despite 
the tremendous decline in the German GDP, for example, many nations continued to 
demand their financial reparations from the Treaty of Versailles. Some states intervened 
heavily in the economy—nationalizing countless banks and creating the wide-ranging 
systems of social protection that we recognize today as the foundations of the modern 
welfare state.  Other more liberal decision-makers blamed exactly these Keynesian 
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interventions in the economy for extending the recession.  Despite the fact that the Great 
Depression had wide-ranging impacts across the globe, paradoxically globalization 
seemed to stop as international trade slowed to a crawl and the world’s governments 
failed to cooperate and coordinate their corrective responses. 
 Following the conclusion of World War II, the Allied leaders eventually 
understood that their protectionist legislation had created an economic environment that 
had inevitably led to a war for resources.  Therefore the GATT (the predecessor to 
today’s World Trade Organization) was created with the simple task of mutually 
lowering tariff barriers to global commerce (Teulon 2008: 66).  Leading European 
nations as well as the political leaders of the United States, Canada, and others were well 
aware that the financial struggles of Italy and Germany had led to the rise of Nazism and 
fascism, as well as the fact that Japanese resource dependency led directly to the 
bombings of Pearl Harbor.  Therefore, the international organizations created at the 
Bretton Woods Conference were charged with ensuring that the nations of the world 
would never again be able to close themselves off from one another.  Theoretically, 
collective actions taken by the world’s developed nations would help to mitigate the 
negative consequences of future economic crises. 
 Unfortunately, human experience dictates that those who fail to study and learn 
from the mistakes of history are doomed to repeat them.  Though the current financial 
crisis came about far less suddenly than Black Thursday and the subsequent stock market 
crashes, many of the same economic indicators should have led us to believe that a 
recession was imminent.  Similar to the rampant financial speculation of the “Roaring 
Twenties”, the construction and housing industries were operating at unsustainable levels 
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on both sides of the Atlantic.  Additionally, many governments continue to run massive 
levels of public debt in order to supply extraordinary spending levels on such things as 
national defense and social security programs.  Consumers themselves also shoulder 
much of the blame for their accrual of unmanageable levels of debt, financed in large part 
by banks and investors willing to take on increasingly risky applications. 
Exactly the wrong response to this current financial and credit crisis, however, 
would be to repeat the gross historical error of closing off national markets to foreign 
goods.  The percentage of the American and European Union economies which are 
directly dependent on foreign direct investment as well as the sale of exported goods have 
never ceased to increase since the conclusion of World War II.  Therefore, a protectionist 
response to the current recession would in fact have exponentially more disastrous results 
than the already horrendous consequences of Hawley-Smoot and the retaliatory measures 
it provoked during the 1930s. 
 Interestingly, global leaders have once again taken a wide range of different 
approaches to dealing with the present financial crisis, often at striking odds with the 
political history of their respective countries.  For example, despite the dirigiste traditions 
of heavy-handed interventions in the French economy, it is readily apparent that the 
French government has reacted with considerably more fiscal restraint in the face of 
today’s economic conditions.  Meanwhile, the American government has clearly taken a 
leading role in responding to the financial crisis through President Obama’s massive 
stimulus package, the nationalization of several banks and notable corporations including 
General Motors, and the expansion of government involvement into new economic 
sectors.  In both the French and American cases, foreign governments have often 
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justifiably complained about conditions imposed by states and their stimulus packages 
that force government funds to be spent on domestic goods and services.  If the example 
and historical suffering of the Great Depression has not already taught us about the 
dangers of shutting nations off from one another, this worrying trend towards so-called 
economic nationalism risks to once again throw the world economy deeper into 
recession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM – DEFINING THE ISSUE 
 
 
 Before investigating the protectionist nature of many national responses to the 
financial crisis, it is first necessary to define the concept of economic nationalism, and to 
explain the inherent risks and consequences of protectionism.  While not a particularly 
easy term to define, economic nationalism certainly goes against the idea of free and fair 
competition that is at the heart of the European Union’s competition policy and its 
endeavor to achieve a fully integrated single market.  “Le concept est contraire à l’idée 
de concurrence libre et non faussée prônée, notamment, par la Commission européenne. 
On peut l’analyser comme l’intention de la part du consommateur, d’entreprises ou 
d’États, de favoriser les entreprises et les productions au sein de leur nation” 
(Euractiv.com – “Le patriotisme économique envahit-il l’Europe ?” 2008).   Nationalistic 
preferences are also against at least the rhetoric of U.S. economic policy, which has for 
decades emphasized the role and the ability of the free market to adjust and regulate 
itself.  Essentially, economic nationalism boils down to the preferential treatment given to 
domestic producers and corporations by governments and local consumers.  Through 
their purchasing practices and via subsidies favoring so-called “national champions,” 
governments distort markets in favor of their own national industries—much to the 
chagrin of economists and analysts promoting free and open international trade. 
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Especially during times of crisis, it becomes easy to politicize economic strife and 
justify government investment and preference for domestic corporations in an effort to 
keep investments local and retain key jobs (and therefore votes).  The problem is that 
today, the economy is more globalized than many local and national politicians would 
like to admit.  It becomes incredibly difficult to reasonably and economically defend 
stopping trade and government transfers at national borders in a world where truly 
national production and consumption has certainly slowed and practically ceased to exist.  
Even back in 2005, Frédéric Lemaître, an economic analyst at Le Monde noted that,  
Dans une économie mondialisée, il serait logique que le rôle [de protection des 
entreprises] soit défini au niveau mondial. Ce n’est pas le cas. Seul le commerce 
fait l’objet des règles internationales et toute aide publique peut être désavouée 
au nom de la sacro-sainte concurrence. Faute d’une véritable entente 
internationale sur ce sujet, le patriotisme économique risque de tourner à une 
véritable guerre économique. (Lemaître 2005) 
While not necessarily sparking international trade wars, national protectionist actions 
have the potential for inciting retaliatory measures to be taken across the world, much as 
seen during the height of the Great Depression.  Despite any logic that global economic 
governance in terms of the protection of jobs and key strategic industries might have, all 
too often national politics intervene.  Particularly during an economic recession in which 
voters and citizens are especially vulnerable—and therefore increasingly likely to support 
government intervention—protectionist interests often win the political debate between 
the free market and preferential treatments for domestic producers. 
 Of course, it would be incorrect to state that the state has no role in the economy, 
or that the markets are in fact fully capable of self-regulation.  There are indeed many 
situations in which protectionist measures, when taken in reasonable limits and for 
determined periods of time, are incredibly efficient ways of stimulating the economy of a 
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given state.  As during the Great Depression, the current financial crisis necessitated the 
involvement of the U.S. government to prevent large banks from filing for bankruptcy.  
Clearly, in times of economic recession, loans are needed to trigger investment and 
reinvigorate consumer spending.  Thus, without the role of government money 
supporting the troubled banks, the problem could have become even worse.  Another 
typical example of justifiable economic nationalism lies within the realm of national 
defense.  In such a strategic and vital sector, it would make little sense to outsource jobs 
and technologies to potential global competitors (Euractiv.com – “Le patriotisme 
économique envahit-il l’Europe?” 2008). Many economists and government spokesmen 
have also used just this sort of argument to justify government subsidies both in the U.S. 
and the European Union to benefit Boeing and Airbus, for example. 
 Still, the world must tread carefully when deciding which national industries are 
truly vital and therefore worthy of defense from the open world market.  Certainly, 
politicians are feeling the pressures from their constituencies to ensure that their now-
limited tax revenues are spent and reinvested at home.  Yet, governments must also 
ensure that their borders remain open to international trade and investment, or else the 
real risks of retaliation might resurface and trigger an even greater economic downturn. 
“The argument [in favor of economic nationalism] that protectionism will not get very 
far—is dangerously complacent. True everybody sensible scoffs at Reed Smoot and 
Willis Hawley, the lawmakers who in 1930 exacerbated the Depression by raising 
American tariffs. But reasonable people opposed them at the time, and failed to stop 
them: 1,028 economists petitioned against their bill” (The Economist – “The Return of 
Economic Nationalism” 2009).  Once governments start passing legislation which creates 
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powerful constituencies in their favor, such as the defense of a large local corporation, it 
becomes easy to justify further interventions.  The problems arise when foreign trade 
partners start defending their own local industries as well, all to the detriment of world 
consumers who are suddenly subjected to higher commodity prices.  States love to pick 
out certain industries and proclaim these national champions as worthy of defense and 
government investment during economic booms and busts.  However, economic realities 
dictate that state subsidies to financially insolvent companies eventually run out and the 
world economy is worse off after the inevitable retaliation takes place. 
 Clearly, policies promoting national protection are having an effect on the 
international marketplace.  For the first time in decades, globalization appears to be 
slowing, and trade in goods and services across international borders is falling both in 
terms of product value and sheer quantity of commodities.  World Bank statistics 
strikingly demonstrate the historic drop-off in trade values since the start of the financial 
crisis: “Monthly US imports and exports of goods declined by about one-third (emphasis 
in original) in value terms from peaks of $195 bn and $121 bn, respectively in July 2008, 
to $122 bn and $85 bn respectively, in February 2009” (Borchert and Mattoo 2009: 4).  
Additionally, due to the difficult economic climate, foreign direct investment on behalf of 
both private companies as well as governments has plummeted (The Economist – “The 
Return of Economic Nationalism” 2009).  Not since the oil shocks of the 1970s have 
global trade levels retreated, yet last year, global trade receded from its all-time high due 
to the political pressures across the developed world to protect domestic industries: “In 
2008, world trade declined for the first time since 1982.  And, despite their pledges, 
seventeen G-20 members have adopted significant trade restrictions” (Patrick 2009).  
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While gathered for the G-20 meetings in London earlier this year, each of the heads of 
state signed a promise not to erect barriers to trade, however their actions have belied 
their words. 
One needs to look no further than the World Trade Organization’s own internal 
statistics to realize the extent of the damage caused by the financial crisis upon global 
trade flows.  On March 25th, WTO analysts predicted that: “The collapse in global 
demand brought on by the biggest economic downturn in decades will drive exports 
down by roughly 9% in volume terms in 2009, the biggest such contraction since the 
Second World War” (“WTO sees 9% global trade decline in 2009as recession strikes” 
2009).  Things look certain to get worse before they get better, as global output growth in 
terms of world GDP shrank from 3.5% in 2007 to 1.7% in 2008.  Economic growth is 
actually expected to turn negative on a global scale in 2009, by a factor of between 1 and 
2%.  Unfortunately, by closing their markets off from the outside world, political leaders 
across the globe are perhaps exacerbating an already dismal economic situation. 
Despite their claims to understand the key role played by trade in generating an 
economic recovery, the vast majority of major industrialized economic powers have 
instituted some forms of protectionism in response to the crisis.  Using France and the 
United States as case studies, an analysis of the political pressures for protectionism, as 
well as the governments’ respective responses, combine to highlight the negative impact 
of the politicization of trade policy on the world’s economy. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE AMERICAN CASE 
 
 
Protectionist Responses to the Crisis – “Buy American” and Intervention 
Regardless of the factors which ignited the crisis, what matters going forward is 
how governments react, especially the U.S. government acting as the world’s preeminent 
economic power.  Predictably, as is the case during any sizeable economic recession, 
interest groups clamoring for domestic protection and economic nationalism have been 
active politically and are making an impact in Washington.  Most notably, during 
negotiations in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Democrat-
controlled Congress added stipulations in the administration’s massive economic 
stimulus package requiring money to be spent on infrastructure projects to be spent on 
American-produced goods and services.  According to the version of the federal 
economic stimulus plan signed into law by President Obama: “None of the funds 
appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used for a project … unless 
all of the iron, steel, and manufactured goods used in the project are produced in the 
United States” (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009 §1605 (a)).  Very few 
exceptions to this requirement—including the lack of suitable American-made goods, as 
well as a stipulation that if the purchase of American products will increase the price of a 
project by at least 25%—are listed as suitable excuses for the purchase of imported 
commodities.  Only after the press got a hold of the final versions of the proposed 
14 
 
legislation and foreign powers began pressing the United States to repeal this clearly 
protectionist and trade-distorting requirement to “buy American” did Congress add the 
last-minute stipulation that the requirements to use American products be applied only: 
“in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements” 
(American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009 §1605 (d)).  One finds it difficult to 
imagine, however, a scenario in which the federal government pursues legal action 
against any state or local agency failing to comply with American obligations under 
bilateral and World Trade Organization trade laws.  Moreover, it is highly unlikely that 
the state and local authorities applying for and spending the stimulus money have an 
adequate knowledge of specific requirements of international trade agreements which the 
United States are bound by. 
In the short term, the requirement to invest the vast amount of stimulus money on 
American goods and construction work may seem like a politically advantageous 
decision taken by the administration.  However, President Obama signed a resolution at 
the recent G20 meetings in London against giving into the temptations of protectionism 
and economic nationalism in recognition of free trade’s positive influence on the global 
economy.  His signature of the stimulus package which still includes protectionist 
provisions promoting the sale and use of solely American steel and manufactured goods 
seems to indicate a break of that promise.  Before signing the stimulus package into law, 
he even came out publicly against the “Buy American” provisions that the House and 
Senate had added to the bill (The Economist – “The Return of Economic Nationalism”).  
While the opposition of the administration did convince the conference committee 
version of the bill to add in the condition that American international trade obligations are 
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to be met, the clearly nationalistic legislation is sure to inspire retaliatory measures 
among U.S. trading partners. 
Where then, did the pressure for the Buy American provisions come from?  
Principally, pressures from American manufacturing lobbies, including the powerful 
United Steelworkers Union—which conveniently happens to be strongly based in 
politically significant parts of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Ohio—argued forcefully for 
their inclusion into the stimulus package.  Along with other labor unions, the 
steelworkers were strong advocates for Obama’s presidential candidacy during the 2008 
elections, and thus their opinions count on Capitol Hill.  During the Congressional 
negotiations, the steel and iron workers’ representatives claimed that the only way to 
ensure that the money spent on stimulating the economy effectively was to essentially 
give American producers a 25% price cushion in manufactured goods (The Washington 
Post – “Buy American Rider Sparks Trade Debate” 2009).  This is far from the first time 
that the U.S. steel industry has agitated for protection.  Memorably, in 2002, President 
Bush unilaterally raised American steel tariffs in order to win support for the trade 
promotion authority (“fast track” negotiation responsibility) necessary to jumpstart Doha 
Round trade talks.  The approval of Congress to give in to these protectionist pressures 
certainly seems politically useful in times of economic recession, and it certainly would 
have been difficult for any serious political debate in opposition to such a patriotic term 
as “Buy American” to have succeeded. 
However, the results of the stimulus spending restrictions have been mixed, at 
best, in terms of protecting and creating jobs in the United States.  Since the global 
economy has become increasingly interconnected, it is difficult for companies competing 
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for federal stimulus dollars to ensure that the industrial products being used in stimulus 
construction projects are truly of American origin.  Companies based in the U.S., as well 
as foreign companies with American affiliates are all scrambling to find sources of 
American products so that they too can be eligible for government funding.  As the New 
York Times stated on June 3, “Foreign and domestic companies that employ hundreds of 
workers in this country cannot bid for government projects because they cannot guarantee 
the American provenance of all the steel, iron, and manufactured goods in their supply 
chain, as the provision requires.  Others are scrambling to figure out whether American-
made alternatives exist to replace their foreign inputs” (New York Times – “The Peril of 
‘Buy American’ 2009).  Paradoxically, American companies, as well as American 
employees working for foreign firms are being harmed in both the short and long term by 
the necessity imposed by Washington to buy American products.   
In fact, if any jobs at all are created by the provisions included in the stimulus 
package, their numbers are far outweighed by the costs of both foreign retaliatory 
measures, as well as the impossibility of procuring enough American goods to complete 
the many infrastructural projects.  In an analysis performed by the Peterson Institute of 
International Economics, the Buy American provisions of the stimulus could create or 
protect approximately 9000 American jobs.  However, in a labor market of over 140 
million workers, 9000 appears to be little more than a mathematical error, rather than any 
sort of significant political or strategic gain (Hufbauer and Schott 2009: 1).  
Contrastingly, the number of American jobs that are strictly tied to foreign government 
procurement spending is well over 650,000 (New York Times – “The Peril of ‘Buy 
American’” 2009).  Imagine the consequences on the U.S. job market if and when 
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America’s trade partners enact the inevitable retaliatory measures which would limit their 
own spending to exclude American manufactured goods.  Specifically, the United States 
is at considerable risk to retaliation from countries such as Argentina, Brazil, India, and 
China whose tariffs against American goods are well below their WTO-mandated levels.  
Additionally, these states are also not signatories of the WTO’s Government Procurement 
Agreement that obliges the United States, Canada, the EU and others to include each 
other’s goods in government spending projects.  Any temporary job increases based on a 
swell in demand for U.S. iron, steel, and other goods will soon by far outweighed by the 
prospective negative impacts the legislation will have on the openness of U.S. export 
markets. 
Fortunately for the American worker and economy, a prominent effort by local 
and provincial governments in Canada has delayed its October 5, 2009 deadline on 
excluding American products from Canada’s own stimulus package spending (CBC News 
– Canada “Buy American Exemption Deal in the Works” 2009).  This is due to the 
ongoing talks between Washington and Ottawa to exempt one another from their limits 
on imports bought using stimulus money.  As our largest trading partner, the Canadian 
reaction to the Buy American program is an important one, as clearly the trade 
relationship with our neighbors to the North is one that needs to be maintained and 
expanded rather than contracted. 
Even worse than the potential loss of American jobs in retaliation for the Buy 
American provisions, are the potential negative effects of the passage of these 
protectionist measures on the reputation of the United States.  While it is completely 
normal and politically salient to focus primarily on domestic constituencies during times 
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of economic crisis, the U.S. stands to lose much of its credibility as a global trade actor as 
a result of its protectionism during the current financial disaster.  Suddenly, the US will 
seem completely hypocritical when imploring other nations to open their borders to 
American goods and services, as it simultaneously shuts the door on the entry of foreign 
products into government projects: “In a stroke, the United States would forfeit the moral 
high ground when it comes to slowing the protectionist juggernaut that now threatens the 
world economy. Enacting Buy American requirements would open the door for countries 
worldwide to walk away from their trade obligations” (Hufbauer and Schott 2009: 7).  
Representatives from the European Commission, China, Canada, and other governments 
have all responded that they will not take the Buy America provisions lightly, and are 
likely to revisit their own commitments to both free trade generally as well as to 
American imports more specifically.  Suddenly the world might be again subjected to a 
wave of protectionism such as what followed the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act in the 1930s.  Since the economic stimulus package represents one of the first major 
policy proposals and achievements of the new Obama administration, it is imperative that 
the President shows leadership in promoting free trade, rather than leading the world 
down the dangerous path of economic nationalism. 
Of course, the requirements listed in the financial stimulus package that firms buy 
and use American goods with the federal money are far from the only changes 
Washington has made in its efforts to solve the country’s economic difficulties.  The 
massive amounts of government spending included in the package have raised the 
amount of government spending as a percentage of GDP (28.1%) to levels not seen since 
World War II.  Included in the over $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment 
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act, are provisions which favor certain sectors of the American economy—including 
banks and the automotive industry—in order to restart economic growth.  Since state 
intervention in the economy has arisen to such a degree so quickly, companies are 
hurriedly investing more and more money into lobbying to ensure they receive any 
possible economic benefits from the newly activist federal government.  “The massive 
intervention has shifted the way companies do business in a host of ways—not all of 
them intended by the government. Increasingly, companies big and small are competing 
on the basis of their ability to tap government money” (The Wall Street Journal – “U.S. 
Government intervention pits ‘gets’ against ‘get-nots’” 2009).  Evidently, the funds 
appropriated to these prioritized sectors are going to American firms with powerful 
lobbying capabilities, thus handicapping the ability of foreign affiliates, as well as smaller 
American companies, to comparably benefit from the state’s investments. 
While an active role in directing economic recovery can be expected to minimize 
the immediate damage caused by the financial crisis, over the long-term, a heavy-handed 
state will diminish prospects for growth.  Administration heavyweights including Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke as well as President Obama himself have all attempted 
to assuage the fears of economists and business leaders that the state’s sizeable role will 
linger after the crisis has been averted.  Yet, industry representatives have failed to see 
how the state can quickly remove itself from the many commitments it has made in 
response to the recession.  As a recent Wall Street Journal poll found: “only 16% [of 
economists] believed the federal government would be able to meet its goal of ending 
rescue programs without fundamentally altering the competitive landscape of the private 
sector” (The Wall Street Journal – “U.S. Government intervention pits ‘gets’ against ‘get-
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nots’” 2009).  Many of these same economists expressed their fear that extending the 
state’s role in the economy could have serious negative repercussions by sustaining 
unprofitable corporations selected for government aid, as well as burdening future 
generations with spiraling national debt and inflation.  By acting to specifically protect 
certain strategic domestic industries, the government has intervened to such a degree not 
seen since the end of the Great Depression.  Ultimately, the country’s ability to fully 
recover after the crisis is over will be hampered if the state fails to keep its promise of 
dramatically reducing its role in the economy. 
A Case Study in Nationalist Protectionism - the Automotive Industry 
 Along with the housing market, perhaps the hardest hit sector of the global 
economy has been the automotive industry.  Without a lot of expendable income, fewer 
and fewer people are able to afford to invest in a new car, and thus the industry has been 
hammered by the current financial crisis.  Unfortunately, the timing could not have been 
worse for Detroit’s “Big Three” auto manufacturers: General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, 
who were already struggling to remain afloat under increasing competition from foreign 
automakers on the American market.  Judged to be an essential piece of the American 
economy, and as being “too big to fail” both culturally and politically, Washington has 
stepped in to either bailout the companies financially or directly run them operationally. 
 Perhaps the most directly protectionist and trade-distorting measure taken thus far 
by the federal government has been the decision to let GM fall into Chapter 11 
bankruptcy and to then take over a 60% share in the corporation.  While the company had 
been open to international competition, it had seen its market share both in the United 
States and on the global market continue to diminish as it stubbornly refused to produce 
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economical and environmentally-friendly cars, preferring instead to continue to produce 
mostly Sport Utility Vehicles and trucks.  Yet despite the failure of General Motors to 
adapt to the desires of the modern auto buyer, Washington decided that the 
nationalization of the industrial giant was necessary to bolster confidence in the troubled 
American economy, as well as to ensure the employment of hundreds of thousands of 
manufactured workers across the politically-sensitive Midwest. 
During bankruptcy proceedings on May 1, 2009, the United States raised its 
investment share in GM to $50 billion to assume a majority stake in the corporation, and 
giving the federal government unprecedented control of one of the nation’s largest 
manufacturers.  According to President Obama, the purchase of General Motors was 
necessary, “for the simple and compelling reason that their survival and the success of 
our overall economy depends on it” (quoted in Washington Post – “U.S. Bets Billions on 
GM’s Resurgence” 2009).  However, the increased government involvement in the 
automotive industry is in fact being criticized across the political spectrum in the United 
States.  While Congressional Republicans question the underlying principles of 
intervention and the handpicking of specific companies and industries to bail out, even 
Obama’s own Democratic Party is angry over the fact that despite being under 
government control, the bailouts will require massive job cuts in efforts to restore GM’s 
competitiveness.  Current plans stipulate that GM will be forced to close down 17 of its 
44 plants, and also will be firing over 25,000 American workers in an effort to regain 
profitability.  Massive government investment coupled with massive employment 
reductions should not sound appealing to any reasonable politician.  In essence, all of the 
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problems of Buy American provisions are resurfacing yet again with the auto industry 
bailout. 
While announcing the government’s restructuring plans for Chrysler and General 
Motors, President Obama implored to U.S. consumers that, “If you are considering 
buying a car, I hope that it will be an American car” (quoted in Wall Street Journal – 
“What is an ‘American’ Car?” 2009).  As was the case with supposedly “American” 
steel, iron and manufactured goods prioritized in the financial stimulus package, it is 
difficult to determine what exactly makes a car American.  Is a vehicle American if it is 
produced by a corporation whose headquarters is on American soil, or should a car 
instead be considered American if it is actually produced using American goods in the 
United States? 
Administration officials continue to emphasize that if German and Japanese auto 
manufacturers can continue to make profits even given current global economic 
recession, American firms should be able to adapt as well.  This simply is not necessarily 
true thanks to the logic of comparative advantage.  U.S. manufacturers may simply not be 
capable or well suited to producing every kind of good, and that fact is not necessarily 
bad for the economic well being of the United States.  As Matthew Slaughter of the 
Council on Foreign Relations and Council of Economic Advisors put it: 
The broad goal of American economic policy should be to help all companies 
operating in the U.S. create and maintain good jobs at good wages. Translating 
this goal into sound public policy means rethinking recent [Presidential] sound 
bites, however. It means that the U.S. is not going to be great at everything. It 
means that U.S.-based companies need to be expanding abroad. And it means that 
some of the best companies in America are foreign-owned insourcing companies. 
(quoted in Wall Street Journal – “What is an ‘American’ Car?” 2009) 
Essentially, US economic policy should not pick and choose specific companies to bail 
out based primarily on which country they happen to call home.  Every year, foreign 
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automakers, to give just one example, continue to expand their presence in the United 
States and employ millions of American workers in competitively-waged positions.  By 
virtue of its purchase of General Motors, amongst countless other protectionist responses 
to the current economic situation, the United States has gone against its traditional free-
trade laissez-faire economic traditions, and opened the floodgates for other world 
economic powers to follow suit. 
Recent Developments 
 In an effort to jumpstart the economy to the benefit of the struggling automotive 
industry, as well as to reduce car emissions by improving gas mileage, the U.S. 
government initiated the Car Allowance Rebate System better known as “Cash for 
Clunkers” in the summer of 2009.  Essentially the program sought to renew customer 
spending on automobiles by providing a voucher for $3500-4500 towards the purchase of 
a new vehicle with significantly higher fuel economy than the vehicle being traded in.  
Customers received a reduced price when purchasing a vehicle, and automotive dealers 
were later compensated by the federal government for the difference.  Proving incredibly 
popular, the initial budget of $1 billion turned out to be wholly inadequate to keep pace 
with demand.  Eventually, the government extended the promotion and added an 
additional $2 billion appropriation.  Ironically, despite the limited fiscal costs involved 
with the Cash for Clunkers program, the customer spending it provoked has had an 
exponentially larger effect on the recovery of the American economy. 
Trade experts have been impressed with the program’s odd characterization as 
one of the few government subsidies that has had the de facto effect of actually 
promoting imports over domestic goods.  “The program doesn’t advertise that ‘we will 
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pay you $4,500 if you trade in your domestic gas-guzzler and buy a fuel-efficient foreign 
one.’ But in practice that appears to be the result” (Alford 2009).  Over 70% of the trade-
ins were domestic models, while almost 60% of the new purchases were foreign cars.   
 That the Cash for Clunkers program had no restrictions whatsoever on the origins 
of the vehicles being traded in or purchased cannot be understated.  Actually, among the 
top ten cars sold under the program, eight were import models.  This can be seen as a 
victory for not only the Japanese automakers, but also their strategies to increase 
production in the United States.  Further complicating the question of determining what 
exactly makes an American car is the fact that the two most popular cars sold are 
designed in Japan and made in America: the Toyota Corolla and the Honda Civic.  All 
told, almost 700,000 vehicles were traded in and sold under the auspices of Cash for 
Clunkers.  According to the U.S. Department of Transportation these summer auto sales 
will provide a direct economic boost of 0.3-0.4% to the American economy.  (U.S. 
Department of Transportation Press Release – August 2009).  Additionally, both foreign 
and domestic automakers are expected to increase their production of new vehicles in 
order to replenish depleted inventories, which the government claims will save or create 
over 40,000 jobs during the latter half of 2009.  During a year of protectionist posturing, 
the Cash for Clunkers programs seems to have been an effective measure of government 
intervention that actually promoted international trade. 
 On the other end of the spectrum however, President Obama’s decision to apply 
tariffs against the import of Chinese tires in late September has proven that the world has 
not yet escaped the threat of economic nationalism during this recession.  Prompting a 
swift reaction by the Chinese, the episode has proven that even a small trade dispute 
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between the world’s two largest economies has the potential to seriously retard global 
economic recovery. 
When analyzing the specifics of the Chinese tire issue, it is important to 
understand the particular legislation that President Obama was acting upon when 
enacting this tariff.  During China’s bid to join the World Trade Organization in 2001, the 
Chinese faced significant political opposition, particularly in the United States Congress.  
As such, the so-called China-safeguard provisions allow the President to impose tariff 
barriers against Chinese imports if recommended to do so by the International Trade 
Commission.  Recognizing the dangers implicit in taking such actions against the world’s 
second largest economy which happens to be a particularly important trading partner, 
President Bush declined to raise ITC-recommended tariffs four times during his 
presidency.  However, when the United Steelworkers accused the Chinese of flooding the 
American market with tires below their market value, the International Trade 
Commission recommended a 55% tariff increase—and President Obama agreed to levy 
the import duty at the rate of 35%.  While the Chinese are aware of the legality of 
President Obama’s actions, they are nonetheless justifiably incensed at the President’s 
decision: “The Chinese know the decision is a matter of presidential discretion, unlike the 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, which are on statutory autopilot and don’t 
require the president’s attention. Accordingly, the tire restrictions are the edict of the 
American president, and thus carry more profound meaning for the Chinese” (Ikeson 
2009).  The decision to apply these tariffs came directly from the White House, under 
heavy pressure from the labor unions that make up a significant part of his political base. 
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There are essentially two ways of looking at the issue.  Either the tire issue is 
vastly overblown because bilateral trade in tires makes up an infinitesimally small 
percentage of American-Chinese exchanges, or the tire issue is only the tip of the iceberg 
since President Obama has sent a dangerously protectionist message with his first highly-
publicized trade decision.  One argument on behalf of The Economist and others who are 
predicting that this is only the beginning is the fact that the Chinese safeguard provisions 
allow all other WTO members to apply matching tariffs once any other member has 
imposed them—whether or not their own economies have been affected (Bown 2009).  
However, the larger issue at play is the precedent set by President Obama in agreeing to 
impose these tariffs.  Now that the Steelworkers have successfully gotten tire tariffs 
passed, dozens of other industries and labor unions are currently waiting for their hearing 
at the International Trade Commission hoping the President will protect them as well. 
Defenders of President Obama’s decision, on the contrary, rightfully claim that a 
minor protectionist measure is often sacrificed for the ultimate goal of trade 
liberalization.  For example, in 2002, President Bush initiated highly-controversial steel 
tariffs that were clearly illegal under the United States’ WTO obligations as a political 
favor to constituencies in West Virginia and Pennsylvania.  This happened to coincide 
with Congress’ consideration with the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas as well 
as the President’s proposed Trade Promotion Authority which would strip much of the 
legislature’s ability to influence the President’s trade agreements. Ultimately the WTO 
struck down the tariffs as illegal, and Bush won his negotiation authority by a single vote 
in the House of Representatives.  Writing for The New Republic, Noam Scheiber 
concludes that President Obama is making a similar concession to an important 
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constituency and fulfilling a campaign promise to ensure that America’s trading partners 
obey the rules of international trade in defense of both American business and labor 
interests (Scheiber 2009).   Especially since the goods in question are of such economic 
insignificance, and given the legality of the tire tariffs under rules China agreed to when 
negotiating its entry into the WTO, therefore, perhaps the issue has been overanalyzed 
and overstated after all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
ACROSS THE ATLANTIC- THE FRENCH CASE 
 
 
Motivations and Justifications for Protection 
 Though further removed from the initial wave of economic downturn associated 
with the current financial crisis both in terms of distance and severity, the consequences 
of the global recession were eventually felt across the ocean in France as well.  While 
France has been spared the worst of the crisis as evidenced by the housing and 
construction collapses in Spain and Great Britain, as well as the enormous contraction of 
the German economy which is extraordinarily dependent on exports, Paris was still 
forced to react given the size and breadth of this financial catastrophe.  As across the rest 
of the world, the actions of the French government would directly impact not only their 
own domestic economy, but also the ability of the rest of the globalized marketplace to 
regain its confidence and rebound quickly. 
In the unique position of the European Union Council presidency in the latter half 
of 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy and his government were well placed to lead a 
coordinated European response to the financial crisis emanating from the United States.  
Clearly, in view of the single market that links together European Union member-states, 
and fiscal rules and regulations directed by the European Central Bank which guide the 
Euro-zone countries, the EU economies are linked together more closely than any other 
collection of sovereign states in the world.  One of the first collective European actions 
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was the call for the extenuating circumstances to exceptionally reprieve the member-
states of their obligations under the Growth and Stability Pact.  Notably, during a 
conference of the four European G8 members, the heads of state requested the 
requirement that each European state not be allowed to assume a national debt of greater 
than 3% of its GDP be temporarily ignored (France 2 – “Pas de plan de relance européen 
2008).  President Sarkozy took the lead in calling on the European Commission and 
Central Bank to realize that the crisis required intensive action on the part of the nation-
states, and that restoring economic growth requires flexibility in European directives.  
Recognizing that a common EU reaction to the financial crisis would be infinitely more 
effective, President Sarkozy and his European allies attempted to present a common front 
at the many EU and international summits related to the recession in the wake of the 
financial crisis. 
At the same time, however, the leaders of the European Union states were unable 
to agree on specific collective responses, preferring instead to retain control over stimulus 
packages at the national level.  Especially given the strongly-held position of German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel in favor of tailoring specific economic packages to national 
circumstances, Sarkozy faced a difficult task of unifying the EU behind a common 
position.  While Merkel was insistent on the fact that national plans should not be 
detrimental to European cooperation or international competition laws, her desire to keep 
stimulus money within her own borders was clear, “Angela Merkel a souhaité pour sa 
part que les initiatives des pays membres de l’UE en faveur de leurs systèmes financiers 
respectifs ne soient pas mises en œuvre au détriment de leurs partenaires. Elle a ajouté 
que ‘chaque pays doit prendre ses responsabilités au niveau national’ concernant la 
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crise financière” (France 2 – “Pas de plan de relance européen 2008”).  While 
recognizing the necessity of reinvesting in the marketplace, specifically in national banks, 
to restore investor confidence and the availability of liquidity, ultimately the Europeans 
were unable to reach an accord on the supranational level to coordinate their respective 
plans. 
In the absence of an overarching collective response, the French government took 
it upon itself to restore faith in a worsening economy which combined steadily decreasing 
industrial economic output with steadily climbing unemployment.  While struggling to 
reach the same proportions as the American’s $787 billion stimulus package, France’s 
own €26 billion investment plan was specifically tailored to aid the most directly 
impacted sectors of the economy.  Combining direct state aid to infrastructure projects 
including high-speed TGV trains and low-income housing projects, with rebate programs 
designed to increase consumer spending, France’s economic bailout has been described 
by government officials as an investment in the future as well as a response to the present 
crisis.  Specific measures include rebates towards buying newer environmentally-friendly 
vehicles, as well as tax incentives for research and the development of new green 
technologies (Washington Post – “France Plans $33 Billion in Economic Stimulus”).  
While contradicting his own campaign promises to limit government spending, President 
Sarkozy called upon the rest of the European Union member-states to invest in their own 
economies as well to prevent further economic slowdown.  Emphasizing the temporary 
nature of the measures which are designed to stimulate immediate economic growth, 
Sarkozy noted that, “We do not have a choice.  Doing nothing would cost us a lot more” 
(quoted in Washington Post – “France Plans $33 Billion in Economic Stimulus”).  
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Clearly the lack of a response to a crisis of such magnitude would be unacceptable both 
economically as well as politically. 
One specific aspect of the French economic rejuvenation package has received 
infinitely more attention than any other both within Europe and internationally for its 
nationalistic overtones and its potential to distort global trade—the government’s plans to 
aid its own ailing automotive industry.  In February, President Sarkozy announced plans 
to give both Peugeot-Citroën and Renault loans of up to €3 billion each in order to keep 
factories open and workers employed in France (Euractiv.com – “French auto bail-out 
plan raises EU protectionism fears”).  Responding to a tremendous decline in both 
automotive production and sales in France as well as across Europe, Sarkozy and his 
government made the loans available in order to protect these icons of French 
manufacturing, much like the American intervention in favor of General Motors and 
Chrysler.  Not only are these companies highly visible symbols of French economic 
prowess, they are also a highly unionized and active industry in French domestic politics.  
Given the dire situation facing the automotive industry, in addition to the aid given to 
their American competitors in Detroit, the government needed to act decisively. 
However, the original French plan went one step further than the American bail-
outs, as the loans were conditionally available only if the corporations pledged not to 
shutter any of their factories in France nor dismiss any French employees.  Predictably, 
this caused an immediate outcry across Europe and indeed the world for its blatant 
protectionism.  Heads of State from the Czech Republic to Sweden called out the French 
plan as going directly against founding EU principles of free and fair competition across 
the single market.  Given that both Renault and Peugeot-Citroën operate several factories 
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and employ thousands of Eastern Europeans, fears were understandably raised by such 
leaders as Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek that the loans would require the 
companies to fire lower-wage employees in their countries in order to keep their promises 
to retain French workers.  In preparation for their own turn at the EU’s rotating Council 
presidency, representatives of the Swedish government also heavily criticized the French 
automotive plan.  Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt said that he was “‘very 
worried’ about the growing tide of protectionist economic measures in Europe… [and] In 
a thinly-veiled criticism of France, Reinfeldt said ‘If everyone seeks only to protect their 
own economy, then Europe will only become poorer and fall further behind in this 
economic crisis’” (quoted in Euractiv.com – “French auto bail-out plan raises EU 
protectionism fears”).  An emergency meeting of EU leaders was called in February in 
order to combat this worrying trend towards protectionism.  Finally, the European 
Commission assured the other member-states that it would ensure France fulfilled its 
responsibilities to abide by European competition regulations. 
Ultimately, France was forced to back down from the most controversial aspects 
of its much maligned automotive bail-out plan in the face of such concerted opposition.  
Specifically, the conditionality clauses of the loan agreements to car manufacturers that 
would have required Renault and Peugeot-Citroën not to close any factories within 
France for the duration of the loan were removed.   Thanks to the combined efforts of 
Commission completion officials and the well-publicized efforts of other European 
leaders to dissuade the emerging protectionist threat, Sarkozy’s government ultimately 
backed down (Euractiv.com - “French U-Turn on car rescue plan”).  Paris’ change of 
heart was also welcomed by the European Union’s Directorate General for Competition 
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which emphasized the fact that national recovery plans are to be discussed with the 
Commission and approved by Brussels before being implemented.  While insisting that it 
would remain vigilant in its monitoring of France’s implementation of the automaker 
loans, EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes added that, “It’s important for the 
commission to remove all ambiguity in this case, as Europe must avoid a return to 
protectionism and its negative consequences for employment in Europe” (quoted in 
France 24 – “French auto bailout satisfies Brussels before summit”).  With their 
economies integrated to such a degree, the members of the European Union simply 
cannot afford to react individually to this financial crisis.  Worst of all are such outright 
examples of protectionism and economic nationalism as the (thankfully short-lived) 
French plan to set aside funds for its auto manufacturers only on the condition that their 
investments were to be spent and kept within the borders of France alone. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS: REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE OUTLOOKS 
 
 
As during economic crises of the past, many nations of both the developed and 
developing world are enacting dangerous protectionist measures that paradoxically harm 
prospects for economic recovery of their own economies, as well as globally.  Consider 
the Buy American legislation signed in to law by President Obama for example.  If 
companies can only compete for federal money by promising to invest in American 
products which are necessarily more expensive due to a finite resource supply, these 
companies inevitably must pass on their added costs to consumers.  While a few thousand 
jobs may or may not be temporarily “saved”, the entire economy bears these additional 
transaction costs.  The enormous negative impact is only compounded after America’s 
trading partners inevitably retaliate, effectively closing off the export market to American 
producers.  Ideally, the world would be better served by coordinating its response to the 
current crisis—surely including temporary measures investing government funds in their 
local economies to boost investor confidence and restarting consumer spending.  
However, if nations begin closing their markets off from the rest of the global economy 
to which they are so inextricably tied, the world may yet again bear witness to a wave of 
protectionism turning the current economic recession into a depression. 
While the world is better prepared to respond to the challenges posed by the rising 
influence of economic nationalism thanks to the framework of international agreements 
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and organizations which promote trade liberalization, governments should remain 
vigilant in the fight against protectionism.  For example, the recent proclamations of the 
G-20 speaking out against protectionism would hold more sway if the signatory nations 
had not repeatedly broken their promises.  Timing the release of their noteworthy report 
on the impact of the financial crisis to coincide with the recent G-20 Summit in 
Pittsburgh, the independent watchdog agency Global Trade Alert noted that the G-20 
nations have proposed and enacted over 120 protectionist measures since their original 
pledge to fight protectionism last November (Evenett, Global Trade Alert 2009).  In fact, 
not a single G-20 member state has resisted the political temptation to protect its local 
economy since the first convening of the G-20 in Washington last fall.  International 
pressures to resist protectionism would clearly be more effective if they were enforced by 
these nations which collectively represent 85% of global commerce.  Joint statements by 
political leaders at such high-profile meetings as the G-20 summit in London and 
European Union Council meetings are a start; however more must be done to avoid 
escalating protectionism. 
In stark contrast to the world of the 1930s and the Great Depression, today’s 
global economy has many rules-based institutional barriers in defense of the global trade 
system.  Risks of protectionism again becoming the rule rather than the exception are 
therefore limited, but they are not absent.  Despite the enormous benefits of free trade for 
consumers in the form of lower prices and wider commodity availability, it is a political 
reality that industry interests in favor of protectionism are infinitely better organized than 
these same consumers.  These industries and their labor unions have been victorious in 
numerous political battles during the course of the current financial crisis, and left 
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unchecked, the damage to international trade done by these protectionist measures could 
well extenuate and worsen the economic downturn.   
Though the chances of a nation-state actually removing itself from the World 
Trade Organization, NAFTA, EU, or any other international organization which 
encourages free trade, are essentially nonexistent, there are still many ways that member 
countries of these groups could enact barriers to trade while still fulfilling their 
membership requirements.  A primary risk is that the major trading powers could raise 
their tariffs on imported goods from their current “applied” rates to much higher “bound” 
rates which would be completely in line with their obligations to the WTO.  A striking 
example of this change includes the fact that India could increase its average tariff rate 
from 14% all the way up to 50%, and still be a member in good standing!  Estimates by 
policy analysts judge that moves to bound tariff rates would decrease international trade 
flows by at least an additional 7.7% per year (Drezner 2009).  Additionally, there is 
widespread evidence of the developed nations enacting ever-higher non-tariff barriers to 
trade in the forms of environmental regulations as well as stimulus requirements for 
domestic investment.  Both of these moves have sparked a dramatic rise in the number of 
cases at the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (Drezner 2009).  However, even if member 
states are held to their obligations by the Geneva organization, the fact that cases 
generally last up to 18 months allows nations to enact temporary protectionist measures 
without penalty.  So, again, the probability of a return to 1930’s era protectionism is 
lessened thanks to the wide-ranging international framework protecting trade 
liberalization, however the chances of such a vicious cycle of economic nationalism are 
not zero. 
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In conclusion, political leaders will be held accountable for the results of this 
economic nationalism.  While the current state of affairs is discouraging, it must be said 
that even during the best economic climates, the benefits of free trade are a hard sell 
politically.  Public opinion polls in the United States, for example, have never 
demonstrated a clear majority in favor of free-trade agreements.  As of April 2009, for 
example, only 44% of those polled thought such measures were good for the country, and 
over a third (35%) disagreed.  Even these modest figures are actually a decided 
improvement over 2008, where a plurality actually viewed free trade negatively 
(“Support for Free Trade Recovers Despite Recession” 2009).   President Clinton, for 
example, famously remarked that one of his biggest regrets as president was his inability 
to convince the American public of the advantages of globalization and international 
trade.  This was during an unparalleled expansion of the American economy. 
Especially during a recession, clauses stipulating that stimulus monies will go to 
domestic industries and will protect national workers over their foreign competitors are 
incredibly popular politically.  Therefore, it must be said that the current level of 
protectionism has been far less than could be imagined.  Tariffs against Chinese tires and 
proclamations defending French factory workers to the detriment of their Eastern 
European compatriots are more political posturing than actual rejections of trade 
liberalization.  Ultimately, they are understandable during times of economic strife while 
citizens are seeking actions from their elected leaders in defense of their livelihoods.  
While not ideal and certainly counterproductive to the prospects of immediate economic 
recovery, policies of economic nationalism have largely been held in check both in 
principle and in practice during the crisis. Heads of states will have to continue to balance 
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these political pressures from domestic constituencies who desire protection against 
international demands for further liberalization.  How they respond will ultimately decide 
their own political fates as well as determine the eventual outcome of the financial crisis. 
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